Lauren Vanden Heuvel
Introduction
When discussing the far-right movement and COVID-19, people tend to cite far-right parties downplaying or denying the virus. However, the analysis of the relationship between the far-right and COVID-19 being similar is sparsely mentioned, even though the far-right and COVID-19 are one and the same, albeit the mechanisms of each concept: the replication, dissemination, and evolution. Just as COVID-19 infects individuals and spreads through communities, far-right ideology infiltrates social spaces, amplifying its reach through mainstream media, be it digital or real-world networks. Over time, both COVID-19 and the far-right adapt to their environment, evolving to overcome obstacles of the time. Despite apparent differences, the mechanisms of transmission and evolution make far-right ideology and COVID-19 comparable forces that shape the political and social landscape of the world.
Replication and Evolution
A virus is an organism that multiplies within cells that depend on the host for life-sustaining functions. Their primary function is to reproduce and disseminate. Viruses like COVID-19 are highly infectious in humans due to the lack of encounters in the immune system. Therefore, the far-right is similar to a virus through the replication mechanism. While a virus infiltrates a host by attaching to cells and injecting its genetic material, exploiting the host’s mechanisms to produce viral copies, the far-right ideology spreads similarly by identifying societal vulnerabilities—such as economic instability or cultural fears—and embedding itself through charismatic leaders or media, reshaping narratives to align with its goals. Dissemination through media, fringe platforms, or extremist communities are often mediums for online recruitment, which mimics the location where replication transpires. The users on these platforms often target economic and cultural anxieties, immigration concerns, representation of marginalized communities in media, globalization of the economy, as well as ethnic backgrounds, the parenting style they experienced, and their experience with authoritarian institutions, all of which contribute to the susceptibility of far-right extremism.
Viruses, specifically COVID-19, must continuously redefine itself as a virus to continue replication. At first, a virus can cause extreme illness or even death. A virus that kills its host too quickly or causes severe illness may limit its ability to spread to new hosts. Viruses that allow the host to live longer or experience milder symptoms often have more opportunities to be transmitted, which increases their chances of survival and replication. Over time, less lethal but more easily transmissible strains can become more prevalent, and the far-right is no different.
Dissemination
The dissemination of the far-right can be described in four waves. The first wave is Neo-fascism (which represents the prime COVID strain in the overarching metaphor). Neo-fascists consisted of those who remained loyal to the old ideology and hoped to remain politically active. Several parties of neo-fascists were ultimately banned, like the German Socialist Reich Party, due to the fascist and authoritarian nature of the party. Like COVID-19, this wave generally affected the older generations, as Neo-fascists were ex-Nazis who wanted to continue the fascist movement in Germany post-WWII.
The second wave, Ring-Wing Populism (which for all intents and purposes can be compared to the Delta variant of COVID), opposed post-war elites rather than pledging allegiance to the defeated fascist regime and ideology. Right-wing populism was a less intense version of the former, as it mainly focused on the marginalization of the rural population. Like the Delta variant of COVID-19, this second wave was more transmissible and applicable to a broader array of the population. Some of these parties were also hybrids of the old extreme and the new ideas. Some parties, such as the National Democratic Party for Germany (NPD), were founded by former Nazi officials but later focused primarily on postwar issues like opposing non-European immigration.
The third wave, the Radical Right, gained significant traction in the 1980s and into the 2000s, fueled by unemployment and mass immigration. This wave, comparable to the Omicron variant, marked the beginning of the far-right steadily entering the mainstream and gaining political power. Like Omicron, this was more transmissible than the prior variant and was viewed as less severe (as mainstreaming of this ideology was prevalent). Parties from this era also proved more durable and remain relevant today. An example of a third-wave party would be Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front in France. Having gained momentum in the 1980s, the National Front appealed to working-class voters by emphasizing French nationalism, advocating for anti-immigration, and opposing the European Union, all mainstreamed issues in France at the time.
The fourth wave is the final and most recent (which may be called post-omicron variants). This wave established itself in the mainstream during the aftermath of 9/11 and the Great Recession. This wave ushered in an unprecedented surge of Islamophobia and is characterized as the most popular of the four waves. The far-right issues are openly debated in the mainstream, allowing the ideology to grow significantly. Far-right parties are breaking into European countries where they never existed before through viewing key issues like immigration, globalization, and European Integration to further expand their power in the European Parliament. Post-Omicron variants are widely different, have surges of transmissibility, and are constantly evolving to invade universal immunity. Similarly, the fourth wave hosts a wide variety of subcultures. From QAnon to the “manosphere” to pick-up artist culture, the fourth wave is characterized by a wide variety of subcultures, comparable to the variety of localized variant surges of COVID-19.
Conclusion
Far-right parties and ideologies are spreading exponentially due to the issues that the far-right represents and how the media covers their issues, which mimics the mechanisms of how a virus disseminates. Cultural and economic anxiety are the drivers of dissemination. Since extreme virus strains cannot survive if the host does not survive, a virus evolves as a weaker strain to increase dissemination. Similarly, far-right ideology spreads by identifying societal vulnerabilities—such as economic instability or cultural fears—and embedding itself through charismatic leaders or media, reshaping narratives to align with its goals. Decreasing its intensity throughout the far-right waves, from upholding fascist ideology to catering to general economic and cultural anxiety, allows the far-right to be mainstream and, hence, easily disseminated.
Just as viruses mutate and persist, so do far-right ideologies, adapting to the political climate to ensure their survival. The failure to address the root causes of these ideologies—whether through political reforms or combating misinformation—allows them to persist and continue spreading, much like untreated viral infections.
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